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Peer Vries en Marjolein van Rotterdam 
In your book you défend a thesis that is populär amongstudents of nationalism 
by asserting that in your opinion the nation, and therefore nationalism, is a 
'novelty'. I agree that these concepts, in the specific sensé in which you use 
them, are modern. But on the other hand there is a chapter in your book called 
'Populär proto-nationalism', which suggests nationalism is not a complete 
novelty after ail. What exactly in your opinion is the relationship between this 
proto-nationalism and nationalism? Is there a fundamental break and 
différence between them? 
I do not think they are fundamentally the same. The essence of nationalism, as it 
develops from the eighteenth Century on wards, is that the idea of a particular people 
and the idea of the state should coincide, however the people is defined. In the case 
of what I call 'proto-nationalism', and what other people call ' national consciousness ' 
or something like that, there is practically never the assumption that this 
consciousness has anything to do with the actual form of political Organization 
under which people live. The two examples I give in my book, are those of the Jews 
and the Germans. Among the Jews the consciousness is age-old that they are a 
people different from all the other people they live among. But that never in fact 
implied the longing for a particular, special state for Jews. Very possibly because 
this kind of state was not recognized any where during this period. The Germans 
have lived in various colonies and Settlements over large parts of Europe. But to 
the best of my knowledge until the nineteenth Century there has never been a 
problem which arises from the fact that they lived under rulers who were not 
Germans or in states that were not identified with Germans. 
Does this imply that you do not think, as for example A.D. Smith does, that 
there are ethnie origins of nations, or at least that you do not regard them as 
fundamental?1 
There is ethnie consciousness, and quite often it is very strong. In my view it is often 
strongest in those cases where it is directed not against a particular foreign state, 
but against any state. That is for example the case with the Berbers in North Africa, 
the Pathans in Afghanistan or the Highland Scotsmen and a number of others, of 
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which the Kurds are the most recent example. I do not believe that until after 
Versailles the problem of an independent Kurdistan aróse, because I do not believe 
that the Kurds saw themselves as in any way requiring this. The states under which 
they li ved, were not national states in any sense either. So while I am sure that Smith 
is right that there is a very strong and quite often very ancient sense of ethnie 
cohesión, I do not believe it has any automatic connection with nationalism. Of 
course it can be very easily turned in to something like nationalism. 
You describe popular proto-nationalism as 'feelings of collective belonging 
which already existed and which could opérate... on the macro-political scale 
which could fît in with modera states and nations'.2 In what sense is this 
différent from 'ethnie consciousness'? 
I think the différence is a big one. Smith concentrâtes on ail types of ethnie 
consciousness. In my chapteron proto-nationalism I concéntrate on such sentiments 
as may exist before modem nationalism and which could help to make it more 
easily acceptable and adoptable. I think for example, that the consciousness of 
being part of a strong empire is certainly among those. 
But I suppose that feelings like thèse only existed among the élite. Was it not 
your intention to give 'a view from below'? 
I think that the idea that you are part of, let us say, the Roman Empire, is something 
which undoubtedly can hold together many people who otherwise have little in 
common. If I understand him correctly Gwyn Williams, an excellent Welsh 
historian, suggests for instance that the first way in which the Welsh had 
consciousness against the Anglo-Saxons, was not as Welsh - in fact they did not 
yet have this name for themselves - but as Romans, as Britons defending the 
remainders of the Roman Empire against invaders.3 That does not necessarily 
imply that they identified with the emperor, but at least they realized that they were 
part of a political System. This is I think very important in the case of Russia, where 
the proto-nationalism of the Great Russians is certainly not ethnie. Even though it 
so happens that by modem standards most Russians actually talked Russian with 
relatively less of dialects than in other cultures. 
I suppose that the thesis that the nation is a relatively new and modem concept 
necessarily implies that nationalism is also a novelty? 
The idea that nationalism is something that does not really exist before the 
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eighteenth Century, is acceptée! quite generally. Of course there are a few 
anticipations, like the state-nationalism of England, but yes, I do believe that the 
idea of a State which should express a peopîe and only one people, particularly if 
that is defmed ethnically and linguistically. is very récent. I try and argue in my 
book that in effect this variety of nationalism is even more récent than the concept 
of nation and nationalism in gênerai. The original concept of the nation, as it was 
expressed for example during the French Revolution, was not ethnie and linguistic. 
In this original concept there was an équivalence hetween state and nation in 
that sensé that ail people living in a state automaticaliy belonged to the nation. 
That brings us to the relationship between state and nation. The point of 
departure in your book is that nations do not inake states and nationalism but 
the other way round.41 suppose you do not want to maintain that states are 
always prior to nations. 
Indeed, there are plenty of examples where this is noî the case. But once the idea 
gets around that in a sensé a people should have its own state, you also get the 
possibility of a national movement to create such a state. Not necessarily a totally 
sovereign, independent state. I do not believe for example that the Czechs in the 
nineteenth Century real 1 y thought in terms of sovereign independence, as they did 
after 1918. But clearly, the existence of ail thèse nationalist movements assumes 
the existence of certain types of states to which a nation wishes to aspire. 
So the idea 'state' has to exist before the idea 'nationalism' can arise? 
I would think so. To this extent I converge with Tilly. It is the state formation which 
is really a central élément in the development of nationalism. 
By whom or what is a nation created in case it is not created by a state that 
already exists? 
Well, we have of course a variety of examples of national movements. movements 
to establish at least autonomy. The important élément here, it seems to me, is that 
they should represent what Hroch calls phase C, nameîy that they should have 
mass-backing.5 This should be distinguished from the kind of thing which you find 
in say traditional Poland or Hungary, where there was a political nation which, 
however, consisted exclusively of the ruling class, the gentry and aristocracy. That 
does not necessarily imply a mass-nationalism. Although once you get a mass-
nationalism, it can then reach back to older traditions and use them. In the case of 
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Ireland for instance, there is no doubt that there existed a very strong political sense 
of the Irish being different from and hostile to the English. This desire to be against 
the British could very easily shift over into the programme of separating from 
Britain and having one's own state. Which I think it did in the course of the French 
Revolution. 
In your book you repeatedly refer to the ideas of Hroch. But does not the way 
he characterizes nationalism - especially in its so-called first and second 
phases - collide with Gellner's définition, which you claim to accept. According 
to Gellner nationalism is the political principle that holds that the political and 
the national unit should be congruent.6 How can one, accepting this définition, 
speak of a non-political nationalism? 
The point is that ethnie consciousness, and any other consciousness, can become 
political under certain circumstances. Zionism for instance is an attempt to tum the 
very strong pre-existing consciousness of Jews being Jewish and having a 
traditional relationship to the Holy Land into a political programme. But of course 
Zionism as such is a new programme. 
But still, can one really call Hroch's nationalism in its first cultural and 
folkloristic phase 'nationalist'? It has nothing to do with politics. 
In its first phase probably not. But nevertheless, it is very important, because it 
provides the soil out of which a large number of national images, national myths 
and so on grow. Much of this 'folklore' becomes part of what people begin to see 
as their own identity. 
In your book you emphasize that essentially nations are constructed 'from 
above'. Not completely - that exactly is what you criticize in Gellner's book -
but to a large extent.7 What do you mean by 'from above'? Do you want to 
suggest that the intellectuals, who in my opinion played such an important role 
in spreading national ideas, were members of the political elite? To me they 
seem to be a kind of lower-tniddle class. 
I indeed criticize Gellner because he sees the whole process entirely as a function 
of modernization, a process in which everything is created from above. But I agrée 
with him in so far, that the role from above is enormously important. In a way both 
the vocabulary and terminology, the whole so to speak tool-kit of the political 
nation, i.e. the state, is not found in the traditional populär culture and the traditional 
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populär way of thinking. In most peasant societies for instance there existed the 
alternatives between the village church and the universe. There was nothing in 
between. Well the nation, and the State, in the modem sensé is precisely something 
which is in between. It is perfectly easy for a médiéval peasant to get used to the 
idea of an emperor who raies the whole world. On the village level, the parochial 
levé! so to say, he knows exactly where he is and what politics is. I agrée, in between 
you have lords, but it is very doubtful exactly where they stand. So the définitions 
have to be brought in from outside, even though later on people more or less 
assimilate them. That is what I mean, when I say that the construction from above 
is very important. When, how soon and how quickly the common people assimilate 
thèse ideas. is a very great problem. We do not really knovv. When the masses 
become mobilized on nationalist, or on any other mass-politics, they buy a package 
which contains a lot of différent things. They do not simply go around shopping, 
buying precisely what they want to have. Party leaders or movement leaders corne 
to them, saying for example: 'You should support us, because you are a German'. 
But the programme or 'package' which they offer, contains a lot of things which 
would not necessarily be the ones which they would pick, h ad they been able to 
shop around for each individual item. And so it is not easy to know what exactly 
'the people' think. A i l one can say, is that they identify with 'a people' or 'a nation", 
or with 'us' against some specific enemy. But exactly what that implies, or what 
it would imply, if they did not support a specific party, is not so clear. 
You criticize Gellner because he discusses the problem of nation-building 
exclusively from an elite-perspective. That is the only criticism î find in your 
book. Does this mean that you agrée with his basic thesis, which can be crudely 
su m med up in the Statement that nationalism is a necessary component of 
modernization? 
I do not think that thisis true in the case of ethnic-linguistic nationalism. He is right 
in the purely technical sensé that modernization does require mass-education and 
that mass-education requires a mass-vemacular. In that sensé there clearly is a 
relation. But otherwise I do not think so. I think modernization requires a territorial 
state and to some extent a, what I call, citizen-influencing and citizen-mobilizing 
state. 
Which in itself does not account for the rise of nationalism! 
Except that if you do build such a state, the common sentiment, or civic religion 
if you like. which develops, is something which can be called nationalism. The 
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extreme case here is the United States, where a consciousness of being American 
developed, which in fact is a very strong national consciousness. Even though 
originally the Americans did not like to call their country a nation. They thought 
a nation was something too centralized. This consciousness has become part of the 
political dimension of being an American citizen. But in fact it is entirely as it were 
a function of the American Revolution and the values that this révolution established. 
Is it not a paradox, or even a contradiction, to say that nationalism is an effect 
of modernization, when most national movements were rather - as I suppose 
you will agrée - conservative or at least backward-Iooking? 
If you remember, I try and distinguish really three things. I distinguish the original 
revolutionary concept of nationalism of the American and especially of course the 
French Revolution from the later liberal concept, which dominâtes, I think, most 
of the nineteenth Century. Both these, in turn, must be distinguished from the late 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century version of nationalism which is fundamentally 
ethnic-linguistic, and becomes so more and more. The important element in the 
first is the democratie element, the people-mobilizing element. It sees the state as 
the représentative of 'the people'. How the sovereign people is governed, is another 
matter. 
I think there are more exclusive tendencies in that 'democratie nationalism' 
than you account for, even in the period of the French Revolution. 
Yes, there are more exclusive tendencies. But the nation is not defined ethnically-
linguistically. In practice it may well be that the existence of France makes people 
feel, as I try to show, that for instance French-speaking French Citizens are 
somehow more equal than non French-speaking French Citizens. But in theory they 
are not. In theory they are exactly the same. In the case of the United States in theory 
there is no merit in speaking English. except that everybody in the United States 
speaks English and one may assume that if you do not speak English, you will not 
be a füll citizen. In the liberal concept of nationalism the element of a threshold was 
crucial, that is to say the idea that a nation occupies a particular phase in the 
historical évolution and that this is a phase in which it is bigger than in earlier 
phases. Essentially only those nations arejustified, which are 'viable' and of course 
also which want to be nations. So. consequently, a lot of movements, in fact the 
characteristic national movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
Century, would have been rejected in the nineteenth Century by the libérais and, I 
think, by practically everybody. I quote plenty of examples of people who indeed 
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rejected them. There is the classical example of Mazzini and Cavour, who say they 
may have great sympathy with the Irish, but really, they are too small to become 
an independent nation, they had better stick with the British. Now this would be 
incompréhensible in twentieth-century nationalism. 
I would like to return just one more time to the relationship between 
modernization and nationalism. What do you think is the relationship bet-
ween state-building, nation-building and capitalism? Was it by accident that 
thèse occurred more or less during the same period? 
I am most reluctant to believe that it is by accident. It seems to me that the liberal 
idea, which is that of having a sufficiently large territory with a sufficiently large 
resource-base, is essential for the construction of the early industrial economy. In 
effect the major countries which developed, were medium to large-size states. I 
think that one foundation for this is that thèse states have a better scope for 
development. But whether there is any rational reason why this should be so, is not 
so clear. 
Charles Tilly more or less suggested that the small city-states, the old centres 
of commercial capitalism, could not survive in modem capitalism where the 
rôle of fixed capital is so important. He thinks it would have been very 
implausible for modern capitalism to develop in the old city-state structure.8 
That is certainly true. Nevertheless, there are possible exceptions. I would say that 
the city-state or the small state can establish itself, but only as a function of a very 
large market within which it occupies a particular stratégie position. In the earlier 
days it was comparatively easy to do this, because you could do so on the basis of 
specialized trading. What is on Tilly's mind is, that once you have got essentially 
a basis in production, you need a larger territorial resource-base than the very small 
units can have at their disposai. How big, I do not know. Pollard in his book on the 
European industrialization points out quite correctly that i f you look at 
industrialization, the actual frontiers in fact were relatively unimportant.9 
Industrialization took place in a séries of régions within Europe and in his opinion 
the extent to which thèse were part of a state, was not very important. I can not say 
that I have made up my mind about this. I repeat, I would be most reluctant to 
believe that there is no connection. At least people believed that a sufficiently large 
national market and a sufficiently large national resource-base were necessary. 
Whether this meant that thèse are the nation-state or some other kind of territorial 
state is another matter. The idea that you have to be bigger was certainly the essence 
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of the whole liberal thing: history is, in a sense, the process of getting bigger units. 
Which is a cultural process as well as a political and economie process. 
Do you think that is the progressive element in libérai nationalism? 
Well, at least in the nineteenth Century it was regarded overwhelmingly as a 
criterion of progress. In fact, in terms of what we have now, which is a fairly 
functioning world economy, it has become clear that the sheer scale of the units, 
the building units in this world economy, is not necessarily a positive thing. It may 
be more effective to decentralize units. But, certainly until the early and mid-
twentieth Century, the gênerai assumption was 'Big is beautiful', not only 
economically, but even in terms of production. It is only very recent that people are 
coming to believe that big is not necessarily beautiful and that big corporations, 
while maintaining their control at the top, decentralize and become more flexible. 
You suggest that nationalism started as a 'democratie' or 'liberal' movement. 
But were not for instance the German nationalists conservative from the very 
beginning instead of progressive? 
I do not really believe that. In most countries, including Italy and Germany, 
nationalism and liberalism went together. I think it was a left-wing movement. 
Conservatives were against it. 
But even if this were true, of which I am not convinced, you admit that in any 
case around 1870 nationalism and liberalism parted their ways. Why did this 
happen, why did nationalism become conservative? 
That is a very crucial problem. There is no question that this has happened, and not 
only in Germany. The vocabulary for instance in France of nationalism changed. 
Words like 'patriot', from being previously associated typically with the left, 
became associated typically with the right. 
Could not the political stance of nationalists be related to the fact whether 
nationalism was a mass-movement or not? Is it not true that whenever it 
became a mass-movement, it also became a right-wing conservative movement? 
I do not think mass-nationalism was conservative, at least not invariably. Although, 
it is difficult to say because of what I pointed out as the package-deal thing. There 
is no question for instance that the Irish national movement in the nineteenth and 
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twentieth Century was on the left wing of British politics. Its alliances were with 
libérais, radicals and the others. And I think this is the same with the early 
nationalist movement in tsarist Russia. The Georgian nationalist movement were 
the Mensheviks and they were a mass-movement. So, I do not think you can say 
that thèse mass-movements are invariably right-wing. 
But in most cases they are? 
Where they compete against non-nationalist movements, they certainly tend to be, 
because of the very fact that their major compétition is against the labour 
movement and the socialist movement. But I think it is amistake to believe that they 
are invariably on the extreme right. I mean, the major Czech national movements 
would be in the middle, like Havel, rather than ultra right-wing or they were 
narodny socialist, like those movements that were eventually headed by Masaryk 
and Benes. I think initially small-nation libération movements, which begin in the 
late nineteenth Century, tend to be very much more on the right, partly because the 
only people who were prepared to support movements of this kind, tended to be 
conservatives, who were indeed opposed to large-nation nationalism. 
That still does not solve the problem why the libérais were not able to hold 
their grip on nationalism and why especially the socialists were not able to 
deflect people from becoming right-wing nationalists. At the end of the 
nineteenth Century the biggest national movements definitely were not left-
wing. 
Which ones are you thinking of? 
For example the German nationalist movements. 
Oh, by that time it is perfectly clear that the nationalist movement has become right-
wing. That Starts from the moment that you get democratization and especially the 
economic troubles in the 1870s and 1880s. There is another thing of course. With 
the establishment of large national states, there is a political advantage for 
governments in encouraging hostility to rival states, particularly in the imperialist 
era. There is also a point which I have tried to make and that is the rise of various 
kinds of a discontented petty bourgeoisie, which is undoubtedly much more 
attracted to nationalism. In a sensé it is équivalent to class consciousness for them. 
They dislike both the masses and the capitalists. In so far as thèse are social strata 
which were expanding, and which in various countries were quite large, there is 
then a new basis. 
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And that sort of nationalism is something of a revolt against modernization? 
Yes, although it does not work out. In a sense it is not a feasible program. There is 
no question about it, that this kind of nationalism is very largely an anti-modernist 
movement. The situation however becomes more difficult because of the 
development of politics toward the end of the nineteenth Century with the rise of 
independent movements which are directed against the state and do not accept 
loyalty to it. In some ways the very growth of democracy, in so far as people can 
now identify with their state and with their country, makes people patriotic. At least 
potentially. I mention this to explain why so many of the labour-movements 
genuinely were enthusiastic about the First World War. It did not seem to them to 
have anything to do with being against capitalists. Whereas for instance in a case 
like Italy, where labourers had not become Citizens, this was not the case. It is very 
interesting to see that in Italy the attempts to build a national tradition for the united 
Italy, arising out of Risorgimento, were a complete failure. Unlike Germany, where 
you find all these people building up Bismarck columns and singing songs. In Italy 
when they did this, it simply did not work out. Célébrations for instance of the 25th 
anniversary of the recovery of Rome as a capital of the united Italy: no success! For 
most Italians the Risorgimento was not something which had anything to do with 
them. It was a Piedmontese coming in and in so far as it had a mass basis, it was 
essentially a middle-class mass basis. The actual electorate of the united Italy was 
about one and a half percent of the adult population and consequently you do not 
get an identification of Italians with being Italian. I do not think this actually began 
to happen before fascism. Fascism was the first movement which made Italians feel 
Italian. The only other way in which the Italians before 1914 identified with being 
Italian was probably through being a member of the Italian socialist party. 
Otherwise the problem 'We have made Italy, now we are to make Italians', had not 
been solved. 
Could one not say that nationalism was very progressive, or at least modern, 
in its means, but rather reactionary, or at least conservative, in its goals? 
It is certainly not conservative the world along. In some ways it is a bit like the 
sorcerer' s apprentice. You create a people and then, once you have created it within 
its framework, the people start defining themselves in ail sorts of ways. 
The old conservatives were aware of this. 
The old conservatives were aware of this and kept their distance. The people started 
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to define themselves in ail sorts of ways which you could no longer control. Some 
of which you may find agreeable to you because they are against social 
revolutionaries, but others are not. Especially if you yourself have to establish your 
ideology of citizenship by the usual way, by creating the myth of the state, its 
history, its civilization. Then it does tend to slip out of control. 
What exactly is the social background of nationalists in the différent phases 
of nationalism? 
I think that varies substantially. The original cultural nationalism was probably 
carried by people of a higher social background than the later, more militant 
nationalism. The analysis of that later political nationalism of phase B I think has 
been excellently done by Hroch. I only want to stress that we are not only talking 
about social class, but also to some extent about régions within countries. When it 
cornes to the activists, almost certainly the more the nationalist movement 
advances, the more likely it becomes broadly speaking, a petty bourgeois movement. 
Except in one or two special cases where there happens to have been an almost pre-
national tradition of nationalism, such as among the Polish gentry, which by the 
way was quite a large class. The Polish and Hungarian gentry were something like 
10% of the population. In thèse instances groups which are not petty bourgeois 
were considerably more important. That was not the case with the Croatian 
nationalism. I do not believe there was a similarly large body of Croatian gentry. 
Normally everything was much more in the hands of the petty bourgeoisie and 
especially of the first génération of the vernacular-educated. You can say with 
some confidence that workers, peasants, servants and women in gênerai were 
probably least likely, the latest if you like, to be affected. Beyond this I think one 
really would have to look at the social base case by case. The problem is of course 
complicated by the fact that the définition in any given country of what constitutes 
for example the middle class or the lower middle class may not always be the same. 
When you say it was a petty bourgeois movement, you imply it never became 
a 'populär' movement? 
Well of course that dépends on what you mean by 'populär'. You have to 
distinguish between the movement which eventually won independence and the 
situation afterwards. It could be won at a time when the masses were not politically 
involved at all. How populär thèse movements were, is hard to say. The only test 
I think we actually have, is the élection for the Constituent Assembly in Russia in 
1917. As far as we can see the nationalist parties and movements as such, and 
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certainly the separatist ones, were not particularly important at that time, except in 
the Ukraine. There you can actually test the importance of nationalist issues, 
because there people had the choice between voting for a party called the Social 
Revolutionaries and a party called the Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries. These 
parties were very similar, except in their name. More people voted for the 
Ukrainian Revolutionaries. That makes it quite clear that adding 'Ukrainian' to 
your name had a positive effect. Nevertheless there were quite a large number of 
areas where nationalism was comparatively unimportant, for instance the zone of 
Lithuania that was occupied by the Germans. But curiously enough in Estonia, 
Latvia and Bielorussia the nationalist vote was far behind the pro-Bolshevist vote 
at that time. Of course Georgia and Armenia in the Caucasus were also very largely 
nationalist, but not pure nationalist. What one sees there is people voting for a 
combination of national and social liberation. In Ireland, when democratic vote 
was available, practically everybody, every Catholic constituency, voted for an 
Irish national MP. But even a number of these MPs only slowly learned to call 
themselves nationalists in the course of the period between 1870 and 1914. People 
broadly speaking voted against the English and the Protestants, but to what extent 
they actually sympathized with the militants of the national party in a particular 
area is not so clear. 
Was it in the interest of common people to become nationalist? 
I think it was in their interest if they felt they could combine nationalism with social 
interests which very much concerned them. It was for instance much easier for 
peasants to become 'nationalist' if their landlords, shopkeepers or moneylenders 
belonged to an other nationality. In such a case, where his enemies are Jewish or 
Hungarian, it is much easier for a Slovak peasant to say: 'I am Slovak'. In Ireland, 
the most Irish and Gaelic part, the most depressed part, actually did not get in and 
become active on the nationalist side until the rise of the Land League. The peasant 
could understand the Land League which wanted an agrarian reform. This does not 
mean he was pro-English before! But what actually got him mobilized was when 
the cause of the Irish and the cause of the peasant-holder somehow appeared to have 
a direct connection. Of course it is possible in many cases to get a mass-base in a 
time of foreign occupation or war. There is no reason to suppose that that is class-
determined. 
Earlier on you referred to 'creating the myth of the state'. Could you tell us 
what in general was the role of historians in this process of nation-building? 
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Well, obviously it was an enormous rôle. The tradition, what eventually is taught 
in schools, is very largely what schoolteachers get out of the work of historians. 
Historians have got two possible functions, an early and a later one. Earlier on very 
largely they do in fact spend their time establishing the national tradition and 
merely establishing the nation's history, which is, if you like, establishing a 
national tradition. 
Is that équivalent to 'inventing' a tradition?10 
Well, in doing so, you are indeed to some extent inventing it, because in fact you 
are putting together things which do not necessarily belong together. Having done 
that, of course, that tradition is used, not necessarily in the way in which the 
historians wanted it to use, but nevertheless, it becomes part of the basic material 
of éducation, for example in text-books used in schools. There is much original 
historical tradition which has been turned into mythology. You could not do this 
anymore in the nineteenth Century, in the second phase, because scholarship had 
gone too far. But in the eighteenth Century you could still do it. Originally, as far 
as the nation is concerned, the past is not really important for what it is. It is 
important simply because it actually represents what you want your nation to be. 
In some instances you just invent it. You could forge crucial documents like 
Ossian's poems and the Czech Manuscripts, or you could even invent a druid 
tradition for the Welsh, which everybody knew was a pure invention." But even 
if later on somebody came along like président Masaryk at the end of the nineteenth 
Century and proved that the Czech Manuscripts were indeed forgeries, this created 
considérable political résistance because many people were not interested in their 
truth, they were interested in their significance for national glory. You can see a 
very good example of the extent to which nationalism can actually pay not the 
slightest attention to history in black history as it is sometimes practised in the 
United States. There are attempts to 'prove', simply because it is regarded as 
essential to prove it, that American blacks have had a more glorious history than 
has been known until now. Therefore one actually invents a history which, if you 
can control educational establishments, is then taught in schools. 
Could you say a few words on the future of nationalism? 
I think it has no real future. Of course there are many nationalist movements. 
Nationalist ideas are not dead, far from it. It would be silly to say so. I am afraid 
they can still cause a lot of trouble. But I do not think nationalism is a viable option 
in the sensé that I do not believe the new, smaller nations the nationalists want to 
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create, can have much of an independent future. The future belongs to bigger 
entities. 
Noten 
1. Voor de meest recente uiteenzetting van Smiths ideeën zie: A.D. Smith, National 
identity (Harmondsworth 1991). 
2. E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality 
(Cambridge 1990) 46. 
3. G.A. Williams, 'When was Wales?' in: E.J. Hobsbawm, ed., The Welsh in their history 
(Londen en Canberra 1982). 
4. Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780, 10. 
5. De Tsjechische historicus Hroch onderscheidt in zijn werk een drietal fasen in de 
geschiedenis van het (negentiende-eeuwse, Europese) nationalisme. In de eerste fase 
(fase A) is het 'nationalisme' nog volledig een culturele, literaire en folkloristische 
aangelegenheid, gedragen door intellectuelen en zonder enige politieke lading. In de 
tweede fase (fase B) krijgt het veel meer een politieke strekking en is er duidelijk sprake 
van nationalistische activisten die politieke doeleinden willen verwezenlijken. De derde 
fase (fase C) is aangebroken wanneer het nationalisme een massa-beweging is gewor-
den. Voor een recente samenvatting van Hrochs ideeën zie: M. Hroch, Socialpreconditions 
of national revival in Europe (Cambridge 1985). 
6. E. Gellner, Nations and nationalism (Oxford 1983) 1. 
7. Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780,10-11. 
8. Zie het interview met Tilly in dit nummer, 9 e.v.. 
9. Hobsbawm verwijst hier naar S. Pollard, Peaceful conquest: the industrialization of 
Europe 1760-1970 (Oxford 1981). 
10. Voorde betekenis van de uitdrukking 'the invention of tradition' zie: E.J. Hobsbawm 
en T. Ranger, ed., The invention of tradition (Cambridge 1983). 
11. Voor een nadere toelichting op de 'Czech Manuscripts' zie het artikel van Mout in dit 
nummer. 105 e.v.. 
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